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a b s t r a c t
Weng et al. introduced the notion of conditional proxy re-encryption (or C-PRE, for
short), whereby only the ciphertext satisfying one condition set by the delegator can
be transformed by the proxy and then decrypted by delegatee. Nonetheless, they left
an open problem on how to construct CCA-secure C-PRE schemes with anonymity. Fang
et al. answered this question by presenting a construction of anonymous conditional
proxy re-encryption (C-PRE) scheme without requiring random oracle. Nevertheless, Fang
et al.’s scheme only satisfies the RCCA-security (which is a weaker variant of CCA-security
assuming a harmless mauling of the challenge ciphertext is tolerated). Hence, it remains
an open problem whether CCA-secure C-PRE schemes that satisfy both anonymity and full
CCA-security can really be realized. Shao et al. introduced a new cryptographic primitive,
called proxy re-encryption with keyword search (PRES), which is a combination of PRE and
public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS), and they left an open problem on how
to design an efficient unidirectional PRES scheme.
In this paper, we answer the above open problems by proposing a new cryptographic
primitive called conditional proxy re-encryption with keyword search (C-PRES), which
combines C-PRE and PEKS. We note that there are subtleties in combining these two
notions to achieve a secure scheme, and hence, the combination is not trivial.We propose a
definition of security against chosen ciphertext attacks for C-PRES schemes with keyword
anonymity, and thereafter present a scheme that satisfies the definition. The performance
of our scheme outperformsWeng et al.’s construction,which has been regarded as themost
efficient C-PRE scheme to date.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Nowadays, more and more users store their private data in cloud. To ensure the security of the remotely stored data, the
user needs to encrypt the private data under her public key. However, users usually do not retrieve all the encrypted data
but part of them, which demands a searchable encryption scheme supporting a keyword-based search on the ciphertext.
Consider the following scenario. Suppose all of the data of a company have been stored in the cloud. Alice is the HRmanager
of this company. The content of Alice’s data comprises a body of the data and a keyword that are encrypted under Alice’s
public key. In this case, the cloud provider cannot observe the information of the data including the keyword and message
sinceweneed to ensure the privacy of the shared data. Bob is the director of this company. He is only interested in Alice’s data
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with the keywordw = ‘‘interview result’’ and furthermore, Alice also only wants Bob to read her data (i.e., the ciphertexts)
satisfying the keyword w = ‘‘interview result’’ rather than all of her ciphertexts. Additionally, both Alice and Bob do not
want to let the cloud provider know that actually they are somewhat sharing the data with the keyword w = ‘‘interview
result’’. In other words, the privacy of the keyword itself is important, as exposing this keyword may result in leaking the
important information to the competitors (for example, the cloud can be used by many other companies, including Alice
and Bob’s competitors).
To address this issue, Shao et al. [31] proposed a new cryptographic primitive, called proxy re-encryption with keyword
search (PRES), by combining the notions of PRE and PEKS directly, which means
PRE(pkA,m)||PEKS(pkA, w)
where pkA is Alice’s public key, and w is the keyword with the message m. On the one hand the cloud provider with a
trapdoor can search the desirable ciphertexts, while the cloud provider cannot obtain the keyword. On the other hand, the
cloud provider with a re-encryption key can re-encrypt the ciphertext under Alice’s public key to create another ciphertext
under Bob’s public key, while the cloud provider cannot learn the plaintext and the keyword.
We note that although Shao et al.’s [31] solution for realizing PRES is elegant, there remain some important issues
regarding the use of PRES, which have not been addressed in their paper. The issues are the following:
• First, Shao et al.’s work addresses only bidirectional cases, while it is more desirable to find a solution for a unidirectional
case. They also leave an open problem on how to design an efficient unidirectional PRES scheme.
• Additionally, a proxy in Shao et al.’s scheme is too powerful as it has the ability to encrypt all Alice’s emails to Bob once
the re-encryption key is provided.
• Furthermore, their scheme is bidirectional and hence, it inherently fails to provide collusion-resistance. Consequently,
the proxywith the bidirectional re-encryption key rki,j = xj/xi and the delegateewith the private key skj = xj can collude
together to expose the delegator’s private key ski = xi. This problem cannot be solved by a simple modification.
We note that Yau et al. [37] also proposed a proxy re-encryption with keyword search scheme (Re-(d)PEKS) with a
designated tester, but their scheme is not collusion-safe and unidirectional, and it is difficult to integrate both Re-(d)PEKS
and PRE.
In this paper, instead of extending the notion of PRE,we incorporate the notion of conditional proxy re-encryption (C-PRE)
whereby the ciphertexts satisfying a condition (i.e., a certain keyword) by Alice can be transformed by the cloud provider and
then, decrypted by Bob. In other words, we propose a new cryptographic primitive, called conditional proxy re-encryption
with keyword search (C-PRES), by combining C-PRE and PEKS, which means
C − PRE(pkA,m, w)||PEKS(pkA, w)
where pkA is Alice’s public key, andw is the keyword with the messagem. As discussed in [4,39,40], it is noted that a trivial
combination of these two notionswill result in an insecure scheme. For instance, a naive composition of a stand-alone secure
PEKS and a CCA secure C-PRE may lose data privacy due to the chosen ciphertext attack: when an adversary observes a C-
PRE/PEKS ciphertext CT = C − PRE(pkA,m, w)||PEKS(pkA, w), it can produce another valid ciphertext CT ′ = C − PRE(pkA,
m, w)||PEKS(pkA, w′). Querying CT ′ to a decryption oracle, the adversary obtains the plaintext m. Besides, C-PRE may leak
the information of keyword w since it does not satisfy keyword-anonymity. Therefore, cautions must be exercised when
combining these two notions. Hence, we need to address the subtleties in combining the two.
By studying the definitions and security notions for previous C-PRE and PRES, there remain some important issues to
consider:
• (Keyword-anonymity.) In the previous C-PRE schemes, the ciphertext will leak the information of the keyword, and
therefore Weng et al. [33] left an interesting open problem on how to construct CCA-secure C-PRE schemes with
anonymity. This is also essential for C-PRES scheme to keep the keyword anonymity.
• (Chosen-Ciphertext Security.) Fang et al.’s [16] anonymous C-PRE scheme only satisfies the RCCA-security which is a
weaker variant of CCA-security assuming a harmless mauling of the challenge ciphertext is tolerated. It is even difficult
to construct CCA-secure C-PRE scheme with anonymity, let alone to create the CCA-secure C-PRES scheme.
• (First and second level ciphertext security.) Both of the security notions in [33] and [32] only considered the second level
ciphertext security, and do not address the first level ciphertext security, while the work in [23,34] take into account
both the first and second level ciphertext security.
• (Unidirectionality.) In a bidirectional PRE, the proxy can transform from a delegator to a delegatee and vice versa. In
contrast, the proxy in the unidirectional PRE cannot transform ciphertexts in the opposite direction. The literature has
demonstrated that a bidirectional scheme is much easier to design. Thus, Shao et al. [31] left an open problem on how to
design an efficient unidirectional PRES scheme.
• (Non-interactivity.) The delegatee does not act in the delegation process.
• (Collusion-resistance.) It is impossible to export the delegator’s private key when the dishonest proxy colludes with the
delegatee.
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1.1. Our contributions
As discussed above, it is non-trivial to construct a C-PRES scheme since a C-PRES scheme requires an anonymous IBE, and
the ciphertext of the anonymous IBE can be re-encrypted. It is much more difficult to achieve chosen-ciphertext security
while not jeopardizing the properties of keyword-anonymity, unidirectionality, non-interactivity and collusion-resistance.
In this paper, we aim to address the open problems on how to construct CCA-secure C-PRE schemes with anonymity
and how to design an efficient unidirectional PRES scheme. Concretely, we formalize the security model of conditional
proxy re-encryption with keyword search (C-PRES) scheme. Then, we present an efficient construction of C-PRES scheme
that offers several advantages over previous such systems, including: chosen-ciphertext security; keyword-anonymity;
unidirectionality; non-interactivity; and collusion-resistance.
Our scheme outperforms Shao et al.’s PRES scheme in terms of both computational and communicational costs.
Furthermore, our scheme is collusion-resistant and it is a conditional re-encryption scheme, while Shao et al.’s PRES scheme
is bidirectional only. Compared with Fang et al.’s anonymous C-PRE [16], our scheme is also superior [16] in the following
aspects: (i) In contrast to Fang et al.’s scheme, our schemeprovides CCA-security; (ii) Our schemehas better overall efficiency
in terms of both computation and communication cost.
1.2. Related work
Proxy re-encryption
The concept of proxy re-encryption (PRE) dates back to the work of Blaze et al. [5] in 1998. The goal of such systems
is to securely enable the re-encryption of ciphertexts from one key to another, without relying on trusted parties. PRE
can be categorized into bidirectional PRE and unidirectional PRE. In a bidirectional PRE, the proxy can transform from
delegator to delegatee and vice versa. In contrast, the proxy in a unidirectional PRE cannot transform ciphertexts in the
opposite direction. In 2005, Ateniese et al. [1] demonstrated how to construct unidirectional schemes using bilinear maps
and simultaneously prevent proxies from colluding with delegatees in order to expose the delegator’s secret key. In 2006,
Green and Ateniese [19] extended the above notion to identity-based proxy re-encryption (IB-PRE), and proposed new CCA
secure scheme. In 2007, Canetti andHohenberger [9] also proposed a newCCA secure PRE schemewhere the proxy can verify
the validity of the ciphertext prior to the transformation. In 2007, Chu and Tzeng [12] proposed a multi-use, unidirectional
ID-based PRE scheme, and claimed that it was CCA secure in the standard model. In PKC 08, Libert and Vergnaud [23]
presented a replayable chosen-ciphertext (RCCA) secure single-hop unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme in the
standardmodel. Hohenberger et al. [21] developed an obfuscated re-encryption programwhich translates ciphertexts under
pkA to ciphertexts under pkB. Due to the fact that pairing computation is a costly operation, the subsequent work [15,30,14,
26] focused on PRE schemes constructed without bilinear pairings, especially in computation resource limited settings.
Conditional proxy re-encryption
Instead of converting all ciphertexts, Alice may only want the proxy to convert the ciphertexts with a certain keyword,
such as ‘‘business’’. To address this problem, Weng et al. [33] presented a notion of conditional proxy re-encryption (C-
PRE), whereby only ciphertexts satisfying a condition set by Alice can be transformed by the proxy and then decrypted
by Bob. They also proposed an efficient CCA secure C-PRE scheme in the random oracle model. Unfortunately, Weng et al.
[34] demonstrated that Weng et al.’s C-PRE scheme [33] failed to achieve the CCA-security, and they further formalized a
more rigorous definition and proposed a more efficient CCA secure C-PRE scheme in the random oracle model. Tang et al.
[32] introduced type-based proxy re-encryption. Actually, the construction of conditional PRE scheme had already been
proposed [24] in 2008. In their work [24], Libert and Vergnaud suggested a PRE scheme which provided warrant-based
and keyword-based delegations without random oracle. Recently, Chu et al. introduced a conditional proxy broadcast re-
encryption [13], in which the proxy can re-broadcast ciphertexts for a set of users.
Furthermore, Weng et al. [33] left an interesting open problem on how to construct CCA-secure C-PRE schemes with
anonymity. To fill this gap, Fang et al. first formalized the notion of anonymous conditional re-playable chosen-ciphertext
attacks (RCCA) secure PRE and presented a respective securitymodel [16]. Then, they presented a construction of anonymous
C-PRE scheme without requiring random oracle. Canetti et al. [11] introduced an approach on how to generically turn any
RCCA secure PKE scheme into a CCA secure PKE scheme. Their idea is as follows.
Given a RCCA secure public-key encryption scheme (Gen, Enc,Dec) and CCA secure symmetric encryption scheme (E,D),
let the function (e, d) = Gen(r), where r is the random bits used in generating (e, d), and let l be the security parameter.
Then the new CCA secure PKE scheme (Gen, Enc,Dec) is
Ence(m) = [K ← {0, 1}l; c1 = Ence(K); c2 = EK (c1∥m) : (c1, c2)],
Decd(c1, c2) = [K ← Decd(c1); c ′1∥m = DK (c2); if c ′1 ≠ c1 then m ← invalid : m].
This encryption of c1 functions as a MAC which protects against ‘‘mauling’’ of c1. The user can check the validity of the
ciphertext only when he can decrypt the symmetric key K . But the transformation does not make sense while to transform
RCCA secure PRE scheme to CCA one, after transforming it, the second level encryption would be CTi = (c1, c2) = (c1 =
Enc2ski(K), c2 = EK (c1∥m)) and the first level ciphertext CTj = (c3, c2)where c3 = ReEnc(c1). When an adversary observes
a new second level ciphertext CTi = (c1, c2), it can produce another valid second level ciphertext CT ′i = (c1, c ′2) where c ′2
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is randomly chosen. Clearly, the proxy cannot check the validity of the ciphertext CT ′i = (c1, c ′2) since he cannot decrypt
the symmetric key K . Querying CT ′i to a re-encryption oracle to get the first level ciphertext CT
′
j = (c3, c ′2), the adversary
obtains the plaintextm after querying CT ′′j = (c3, c2) to a decryption oracle.
Public key encryption with keyword search
Following Boneh et al.’s pioneering work [7], Waters et al. [35] demonstrated that the PEKS scheme based on the bilinear
pairing can be applied to build encrypted and searchable audit logs. Baek et al. [3] and Rhee et al. [27] improved the public
key encryption with keyword search scheme in [7]. Furthermore, Golle et al. [20] and Park et al. [25] proposed schemes
that allow conjunctive keyword queries on encrypted data. Recently, Zhang and Zhang [38] proposed a more efficient
construction of public key encryption with conjunctive-subset keywords search scheme. Moreover, the subsequent papers
[4,39] investigated the secure combination of public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) with public key data
encryption (PKE). Because of the fact that keywords are chosen frommuch smaller space than passwords and users usually
use well-known keywords for search, the research reported in [8,22,28,29,36] studied the off-line keyword guessing attacks
on PEKS.
1.3. Paper organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we will provide the definitions and complexity assumption
that will be used throughout this paper, together with the security model of anonymous C-PRES schemes. In Section 3, we
present our anonymous C-PRES in the random oracle model. In Section 4, we compare our schemewith previously reported
C-PRE and PRES schemes. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Definitions
In this section, we first review the complexity assumption required in our schemes, and then provide the definition and
security of a conditional proxy re-encryption with keyword search (C-PRES) scheme.
2.1. Negligible function
A function ϵ(n) : N → R is negligible in n if 1/ϵ(n) is a non-polynomially-bounded quantity in n.
2.2. Taylor’s formula
For completeness, we review Taylor’s formula in this section. We shall incorporate this formula in our concrete
construction.
Let k ≥ 1 be an integer and let the function f : R → R be k times differentiable at the point a ∈ R. Then there exists a
function such that f (x) = f (a)+ f ′(a)(x− a)+ f ′′(a)2! (x− a)2 + · · · + f
(k)(a)
k! (x− a)k + Rk(x).
For the Lagrange form of the remainder [2], there exists ξL between a and x. Therefore, Rk(x) = f (k+1)(ξL)(k+1)! (x−a)(k+1). Thus,
we have
f (x)− f (a)
x− a = f
′(a)+ f
′′(a)
2! (x− a)+ · · · +
f (k)(a)
k! (x− a)
k−1 + f
(k+1)(ξL)
(k+ 1)! (x− a)
k
= a0 + a1x+ · · · + ak−1xk−1 + akxk.
2.3. Bilinear maps
Let G1 and G2 be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, and g be a generator of G1. We say e : G1 × G1 → G2 is a
bilinear map [6], if the following conditions hold.
(1) e(ga1 , g
b
2) = e(g1, g2)ab for all a, b ∈ Zp and g1, g2 ∈ G1.
(2) e(g, g) ≠ 1.
(3) There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(g1, g2) for all g1, g2 ∈ G1.
2.4. The DBDH assumption
Let e : G1 × G1 → G2 be a bilinear map. We define the advantage function AdvDBDHG1,B (λ) of an adversaryB as
|Pr[B(g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) = 1] − Pr[B(g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)r) = 1]|
where a, b, c, r ∈ Zp are randomly chosen. We say that the decisional bilinear Diffie Hellman assumption [6] relative to
generator G1 holds if AdvDBDHG1,B (λ) is negligible for all PPTB.
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2.5. The truncated q-ABDHE assumption
Let e : G1 × G1 → G2 be a bilinear map. We define the advantage function Advq−ABDHEG1,B (λ) of an adversaryB as
|Pr[B(g, gx, . . . , gxq , gz, gzxq+2 , e(g, g)zxq+1) = 1] − Pr[B (g, gx, . . . , gxq , gz, gzxq+2 , e(g, g)r) = 1]|
where x, z, r ∈ Zp are randomly chosen.We say that the truncated q-ABDHE assumption [18] relative to generatorG1 holds
if Advq−ABDHEG1,B (λ) is negligible for all PPTB.
2.6. One-time signatures
A one-time signature [10] comprises a triple of algorithms sig = (G, S,V) such that, on input of a security parameter λ,
G generates a one-time key pair (ssk, svk) where k1 = |svk| while, for any message M , V(svk, σ ,M) outputs 1 whenever
σ = S(ssk,M) and 0, otherwise. We need strongly unforgeable one-time signatures, which means that no PPT adversary
can create a new signature for a previously signed message.
sig = (G, S,V) is a strongly unforgeable one-time signature if the probability
AdvOTS = Pr[(ssk, svk)← G(λ); (M, St)← F(svk); σ ← S(ssk,M);
(M ′, σ ′)← F(M, σ , svk, St) : V(svk, σ ′,M ′) = 1 ∧ (M ′, σ ′) ≠ (M, σ )]
where St denotes the state information maintained by F between stages, is negligible for any PPT forger F .
2.7. Conditional proxy re-encryption with keyword search
In the following, we will provide the definition of a conditional proxy re-encryption with keyword search scheme and
the game-based security definition.
Definition 1 (Conditional Proxy Re-encryption with Keyword Search). A (single hop) conditional proxy re-encryption with
keyword search scheme comprises the following algorithms:
• GlobalSetup(λ): TheGlobalSetup algorithm is run by a trusted party that takes as input a security parameterλ. It generates
the global parameters PP .
• KeyGen(i): The key generation algorithm generates the public key pki and the secret key ski for user i.
• RKeyGen(pki, ski, w, pkj): The re-encryption key generation algorithm, run by user i, takes as input a public key pki, a
secret key ski, a conditionw and another public key pkj. It outputs a re-encryption key rki,w,j.
• Trapdoor(pki, ski, w): The trapdoor generation algorithm, run by user i, takes as input a public key pki, a secret key ski
and a conditionw. It outputs a trapdoor Ti,w .
• Enc1(pk,m): The level 1 encryption algorithm takes as input a public key pk, and a plaintext m ∈ M. It outputs a first
level ciphertext CT under public key pk. HereM denotes the message space.
• Enc2(pk,m, w): The level 2 encryption algorithm takes as input a public key pk, a plaintextm ∈M and a conditionw. It
outputs a second level ciphertext CT associated withw under public key pk.
• Test(CTi, Ti,w): The Test algorithm, run by the proxy, takes as input a second level ciphertext CTi associatedwithw′ under
public key pki, and a trapdoor Ti,w . It outputs ‘‘1’’ ifw = w′ and ‘‘0’’ otherwise.
• ReEnc(CTi, rki,w,j): The re-encryption algorithm, run by the proxy, takes as input a second level ciphertext CTi associated
with w under public key pki, and a re-encryption key rki,w,j. It outputs the first ciphertext (level 1) CTj under the public
key pkj, or an error symbol⊥.
• Dec1(CTj, skj): The level 1 decryption algorithm takes as input a secret key skj and a first level ciphertext CTj under public
key pkj. It outputs a messagem ∈M or an error symbol⊥.
• Dec2(CTi, ski): The level 2 decryption algorithm takes as input a secret key ski and a second level ciphertext CTi. It outputs
a messagem ∈M or an error symbol⊥.
Note that we omit the global parameters PP as the other algorithms’ input for simplicity. The correctness of C-PRES
means that, a correctly generated ciphertext can be correctly decrypted by the user who has the correct secret key, i.e., for
any conditionw, any messagem, any (pki, ski)← KeyGen(i), (pkj, skj)← KeyGen(j), and CTi = Enc2(pk,m, w),
Pr[Dec2(CTi, ski) = m] = 1
and
Pr[Dec1(ReEnc(CTi, RKeyGen(pki, ski, w, pkj)), skj) = m] = 1.
In the following, we provide the game-based security definition of C-PRES. As in [31], we consider the privacy for message
and privacy for keyword. For the former, the adversary is allowed to get the plaintexts of almost all ciphertexts except for a
specified ciphertext. The latter security notion guarantees that the adversary can acquire any trapdoors, except the ones that
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are associated with the specified keywords, and further, it should not be able to decide which keyword corresponds to the
provided ciphertext. This security notion guarantees that only the one who has the private key can decrypt ciphertexts. We
divide it into two level security: security of second level ciphertexts and security of first level ciphertexts. For the latter, the
adversary is allowed to get the plaintext of any ciphertext, and almost all trapdoors except those which are associated with
the two specified keywords, however, it cannot decide which keyword corresponds to the given ciphertext. This security
notion guarantees that only the one who has the trapdoor can do the test.
Additionally, our definition considers a challenger that produces a number of public keys. As in [23], we let the corrupted
users and the honest users be determined at the beginning of the game. Furthermore, we allow the adversary to adaptively
query a re-encryption oracle and decryption oracles.
Definition 2 (C-PRES-IND-ANON-CCA game). Let λ be the security parameter and A be the adversary. We consider the
following two games.
Game 1: (IND-ANON game: Privacy for keyword.)
(1) Setup: The challenger C performs GlobalSetup(λ) to get the public parameter PP . Give the public parameter PP toA.
(2) Query phase 1.Amakes the following queries:
• Uncorrupted key generation query ⟨i⟩: C first runs algorithm KeyGen(i) to obtain a public/secret key pair (pki, ski),
and then sends pki toA.
• Corrupted key generation query ⟨j⟩: C first runs algorithm KeyGen(j) to obtain a public/secret key pair (pkj, skj), and
then sends (pkj, skj) toA.
• Re-encryption key query ⟨pki, w, pkj⟩: C runs algorithm RKeyGen(pki, ski, w, pkj) to generate a re-encryption key
rki,w,j and returns it to A. Here, ski is the secret key with respect to pki. Here, different from [31], we allow the re-
encryption key generation queries between a corrupted key and an uncorrupted key.
• Trapdoor query ⟨pki, w⟩: C runs algorithm Trapdoor(pki, ski, w) to generate a trapdoor Ti,w and returns it toA.
• Test query ⟨pki, w, CTi⟩: C runs algorithm Test(CTi, Trapdoor(pki, ski, w)) where ski is the secret key corresponding
to pki and returns the result toA.
• Re-encryption query⟨pki, pkj, (w, CTi)⟩: C runs algorithm
CTj = ReEnc(CTi, RKeyGen(pki, ski, w, pkj))
and returns the resulting ciphertext CTj to A. It is required that pki and pkj have been generated beforehand by
algorithm KeyGen.
• Decryption query ⟨pki, (w, CTi)⟩: Here ⟨pki, (w, CTi)⟩ denotes the queries on second level ciphertext (level 2).
Challenger C returns the result of Dec2(CTi, ski) to A. It is required that pki has been generated beforehand by
algorithm KeyGen.
• Decryption query ⟨pkj, CTj⟩: Here ⟨pkj, CTj⟩ denotes the queries on re-encrypted ciphertext (level 1). Challenger C
returns the result of Dec1(CTj, skj) toA. It is required that pkj has been generated beforehand by algorithm KeyGen.
(3) Challenge. OnceAdecides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs a target public key pki∗ , a conditionpair (w0, w1) and aplaintext
m. Challenger C chooses a bit β ∈ {0, 1} and sets the challenge ciphertext to be CT ∗ = Enc2(pki∗ ,m, wβ), which is sent
toA.
(4) Query phase 2.A continues making queries as in the query phase 1.
(5) Guess.A outputs the guess β ′. The adversary wins if β ′ = β .
During the above game, adversaryA is subject to the following restrictions wherew∗ ∈ {w0, w1}:
• (i).A cannot issue corrupted key generation queries on ⟨i∗⟩ to obtain the target secret key ski∗ .• (ii).A cannot obtain the trapdoor query on ⟨pki∗ , w∗⟩. Otherwise, the adversary can win the IND-ANON game trivially.• (iii).A cannot obtain the test query on ⟨pki∗ , w∗, CT ∗⟩.• (iv).A cannot issue decryption queries on neither ⟨pki∗ , (w∗, CT ∗)⟩ nor ⟨pkj, CT ∗j ⟩where ⟨pkj, CT ∗j ⟩ is a re-encryption of
the challenge pair ⟨pki∗ , (w∗, CT ∗)⟩.• (v).A cannot issue re-encryption queries on ⟨pki∗ , pkj, (w∗, CT ∗)⟩ if pkj appears in a previous corrupted key generation
query.
• (vi).A cannot obtain the re-encryption key rki∗,w∗,j, if pkj appears in a previous corrupted key generation query.
We refer to the above adversaryA as an IND-ANON adversary. His advantage is defined as
SuccGame1A (λ) = |Pr[β ′ = β] − 1/2|.
Game 2: (IND-L2-CCA game: security of level 2 ciphertexts.)
(1) Setup: The challenger C performs GlobalSetup(λ) to get the public parameter PP . Give the public parameter PP toA.
(2) Query phase 1. Identical to that in the security model of Game 1.
(3) Challenge. Once A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs a target public key pki∗ , a condition keyword w∗ and two
equal length plaintexts (m0,m1). Challenger C chooses a bit β ∈ {0, 1} and sets the challenge ciphertext to be
CT ∗ = Enc2(pki∗ ,mβ , w∗), which is sent toA.
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(4) Query phase 2.A continues making queries as in the query phase 1.
(5) Guess.A outputs the guess β ′. The adversary wins if β ′ = β .
During the above game, adversaryA is subject to the following restrictions:
• (i).A cannot issue corrupted key generation queries on ⟨i∗⟩ to obtain the target secret key ski∗ .
• (ii).A cannot issue decryption queries on neither ⟨pki∗ , (w∗, CT ∗)⟩ nor ⟨pkj, CT ∗j ⟩ where ⟨pkj, CT ∗j ⟩ is a re-encryption of
the challenge pair ⟨pki∗ , (w∗, CT ∗)⟩.
• (iii).A cannot issue re-encryption queries on ⟨pki∗ , pkj, (w∗, CT ∗)⟩ if pkj appears in a previous corrupted key generation
query.
• (iv).A cannot obtain the re-encryption key rki∗,w∗,j, if pkj appears in a previous corrupted key generation query.
We refer to the above adversaryA as an IND-L2-CCA adversary. His advantage is defined as
SuccGame2A (λ) = |Pr[β ′ = β] − 1/2|.
Game 3: (IND-L1-CCA: Security of level 1 ciphertexts.) Next, we will consider the definition of security of level 1 by
providing the adversary with a level 1 ciphertext in the challenge phase. For single-hop schemes, the adversary is provided
with access to all re-encryption keys and trapdoors in this definition. The re-encryption and test oracles thus become useless
since A can re-encrypt ciphertexts or test by himself when given all re-encryption keys and trapdoors. Thus, a level 2
decryption is also unnecessary. As in [14], not only the security of a non-transformable ciphertext with a challenge (which is
defined as CT ∗ = Enc1(pki∗ ,mβ) , i.e., Non-transformable Ciphertext Security), thatwas considered, butwe also transformed
the ciphertext with a challenge defined as CT ∗ = ReEnc(Enc2(pki′ ,mβ , w), rki′,w,i∗) (i.e., Transformed Ciphertext Security).
Thus, the challenge ciphertext would be the form of CT ∗ = Enc1(pki∗ ,mβ) or CT ∗ = ReEnc(Enc2(pki′ ,mβ , w), rki′,w,i∗).
(1) Setup: The challenger C performs GlobalSetup(λ) to get the public parameter PP . Give the public parameter PP toA.
(2) Query phase 1.Amakes the following queries:
• Uncorrupted key generation query ⟨i⟩: C first runs algorithm KeyGen(i) to obtain a public/secret key pair (pki, ski),
and then sends pki toA.
• Corrupted key generation query ⟨j⟩: C first runs algorithm KeyGen(j) to obtain a public/secret key pair (pkj, skj), and
then sends (pkj, skj) toA.
• Re-encryption key query⟨pki, w, pkj⟩: C runs algorithm RKeyGen(pki, ski, w, pkj) to generate a re-encryption key
rki,w,j and returns it toA. Here, ski is the secret key with respect to pki.
• Trapdoor query⟨pki, w⟩: C runs algorithm Trapdoor(pki, ski, w) to generate a trapdoor Ti,w and returns it toA.
• Decryption query ⟨pkj, CTj⟩: Here ⟨pkj, CTj⟩ denotes the queries on re-encrypted ciphertext (level 1). Challenger C
returns the result of Dec1(CTj, skj) toA. It is required that pkj has been generated beforehand by algorithm KeyGen.
(3) Challenge. Once A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs a target public key pki∗ and two equal length plaintexts
(m0,m1). Challenger C chooses a bit β ∈ {0, 1} and sets the challenge ciphertext to be CT ∗ = Enc1(pki∗ ,mβ) (i.e., Non-
transformable Ciphertext Security) or CT ∗ = ReEnc(Enc2(pki′ ,mβ , w), rki′,w,i∗) (i.e., Transformed Ciphertext Security),
which is sent toA.
(4) Query phase 2.A continues making queries as in the query phase 1.
(5) Guess.A outputs the guess β ′. The adversary wins if β ′ = β .
During the above game, adversaryA is subject to the following restrictions:
• (i).A cannot issue corrupted key generation queries on ⟨i∗⟩ to obtain the target secret key ski∗ .
• (ii).A cannot issue decryption queries on ⟨pki∗ , CT ∗⟩.
We refer to the above adversaryA as an IND-L1-CCA adversary. His advantage is defined as
SuccGame3A (λ) = |Pr[β ′ = β] − 1/2|.
The C-PRES scheme is said to be C-PRES-IND-ANON-CCA secure if SuccGame1A (λ), Succ
Game2
A (λ) and Succ
Game3
A (λ) are all
negligible.
3. Proposed CCA-secure anonymous C-PRES scheme
In this section, inspired by Gentry’s IBE scheme [18], we will present our construction of anonymous conditional proxy
re-encryption with keyword search scheme with CCA security. Recall that we wish to create a C-PRES scheme in which a
ciphertext created under condition w can be tested by the trapdoor and then can be re-encrypted only by a re-encryption
key for conditionw. In addition, our C-PRESmust provide several advantages over previous such systems, including: chosen-
ciphertext security; keyword-anonymity; unidirectionality; non-interactivity; and collusion-resistance.
46 L. Fang et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 462 (2012) 39–58
3.1. Our construction
Prior to presenting our scheme, we first present the intuition behind our construction. We select Gentry’s IBE scheme
in [18] as the initial scheme to work with due to the following reason. After using the keyword to replace the identity in
Gentry’s IBE scheme in [18], we obtain the second level (original) ciphertext ((Xig−w)r , e(g, g)r , e(g, Yi,1)r ·m), and the user
using the private key ((Yi,1g−s1)1/(xi−w), s1) under keyword w can decrypt the second level ciphertext. To re-encrypt the
second level ciphertext, we change the private key to re-encryption key ((Yj,1Y−1i,1 g−s1)1/(xi−w), s1). Then, using this key as
the re-encryption keywill result in the encrypted data under user j, say ((e(g, g)r , e(g, Yj,1)r ·m). There are two reasonswhy
we select ‘‘Exponent Inversion’’ IBE, such as the Gentry’s IBE scheme. The first reason is Gentry’s IBE has the advantage of the
identity-anonymity property. The second reason is for ‘‘Exponent Inversion’’ IBE, the principle is to obtain a session key of the
form e(g, Yi,1)r based on a ciphertext g f (ID)r and a private key (Yi,1g−s1)1/f (ID), where f (ID) = xi−ID is a secret function of the
recipient identity but g f (ID) is computable publicly. Actually, the re-encryption key ((Yj,1Y−1i,1 g−s1)1/(xi−w), s1) is protected by
1/f (w)where f (w) = xi−w, thus the scheme is collusion-safe and unidirectional, and it is further non-interactive because
it cannot involve the private key of user j.
Chosen-ciphertext security. The biggest challenge would be how to achieve the chosen-ciphertext security while not
jeopardizing the properties of keyword-anonymity, unidirectionality, non-interactivity and collusion-resistance. To obtain
the first level ciphertext chosen-ciphertext security, we use the Fujisaki–Okamoto transformation [17] since the part of
e(g, Yi,1)r · R (which needs to be re-encrypted) cannot be fixed, then the form of second level (original) ciphertext is
((Xig−w)r , e(g, g)r , e(g, Yi,1)r · R,m ⊕ H2(R)) and the form of first level (re-encrypted) ciphertext is (e(g, g)r , e(g, Yi,1)r ·
R,m⊕H2(R))where r = H1(m, R). To search for the keyword, we can add the term e(g, Yi,3)r to the second level ciphertext,
thus the proxywith the trapdoor ((Yi,3g−s3)1/(xi−w), s3) can search the keyword. Therefore, the formof second level (original)
ciphertext is
(C1, C2, C3, C4, C5) = ((Xig−w)r , e(g, g)r , e(g, Yi,1)r · R,m⊕ H2(R), e(g, Yi,3)r).
To achieve the chosen-ciphertext security of the second level ciphertext, such as [34], one can add the term
H(C1, C2, C3, C4, C5)r to ensure the public verifiability of the second level ciphertext. Unfortunately it does not work since
this will jeopardize the properties of keyword-anonymity. Another approach is identical to Gentry’s CCA secure IBE. It uses
a pair of keys to perform ciphertext validity test, then the form of second level (original) ciphertext is
(C1, C2, C3, C4, C5) = ((Xig−w)r , e(g, g)r , e(g, Yi,1)r · R,m⊕ H2(R), e(g, Yi,3)rφe(g, Yi,4)r),
where φ = H3(C1, C2, C3, C4). Clearly, the trapdoor would be
Ti,w = ((Yi,kg−sk)1/(xi−w), sk)k∈{3,4},
and it can test the validity of ciphertext by C5 = e(C1, dφ3d4)C s3φ+s42 .
Efficient butweaker scheme. If we add a new rule in game 2 of Definition 2, for example ‘‘(v).A cannot obtain the trapdoor
query on ⟨pki∗ , w∗⟩.’’, then we can prove the C-PRES-IND-ANON-CCA security of this efficient scheme. We call this scheme
1. The reasonwhyweneed rule (v) in game 2 is due to the fact that the proxywith the trapdoor canmodify the second level
ciphertext. Actually, there are two kinds of CCA secure schemes: one is where the user with the private key cannot modify
the ciphertext, the other is the user with the private key can modify the ciphertext. The main drawback of Gentry’s IBE is
clearly demonstrated in the situation where the user can use the ciphertext validity test key pair to modify the ciphertext
to the new ciphertext without knowing the plaintext, and the new ciphertext can pass the validity test. Obviously, if we
remove rule (v), the challenge ciphertext can be modified by the adversary who has the trapdoor on ⟨pki∗ , w∗⟩. Further, the
normal proxy cannot detect the modification.
Stronger scheme. As discussed above, we cannot use H(C1, C2, C3, C4, C5)r to ensure the public verifiability of the second
level ciphertext since itwill jeopardize the keyword-anonymity. Therefore,we use strongly unforgeable one-time signatures
by selecting a one-time signature key pair (ssk, svk) ← G(λ) and set C0 = svk. Then, we generate a one-time signature
σ = S(ssk, (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5)). Let φ = H3(C0, C1, C2, C3, C4) and φ′ = H0(C0, C2, C4), thus the form of second level
(original) ciphertext (C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5) is
(svk, (Xig−w)r , e(g, g)r , e(g, Yi,1)rφ
′
e(g, Yi,2)rR,m⊕ H2(R), e(g, Yi,3)rφe(g, Yi,4)r).
When the adversarymodifies the ciphertext, it must change the svk, which entails that φ will be changed, and hence, it is
impossible to modify C5 without the trapdoor. Similarly, when φ′ is changed, C3 of the re-encrypted ciphertext will become
a random value, then the decryption algorithm will output⊥when decrypting this ciphertext.
The description of our anonymous conditional proxy re-encryption with keyword search scheme is as follows.
• GlobalSetup(λ): Let λ be the security parameter and (p, g,G1,G2, e) be the bilinear map parameters. Let the message
space beM = {0, 1}k and the condition space be W = Z∗p . Let H0 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p , H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p , H2 : G2 →
{0, 1}k, and H3 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p be three hash functions. Generate a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme
sig = (G, S,V). The global system parameters are (p, g,G1,G2, e, k,H0,H1,H2,H3, sig).
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• KeyGen(i): user i selects random xi, yi,1, yi,2, yi,3, yi,4 ∈ Z∗p , computes Xi = gxi , Yi,1 = gyi,1 ,Yi,2 = gyi,2 , Yi,3 = gyi,3 and
Yi,4 = gyi,4 , sets his public key as pki = (Xi, Yi,1, Yi,2, Yi,3, Yi,4) and the secret key ski = (xi, yi,1, yi,2, yi,3, yi,4).• RKeyGen(pki, ski, w, pkj): given user i’s pubic key pki and secret key ski = (xi, yi,1, yi,2, yi,3, yi,4), a conditionw, and user
j’s public key pkj = (Xj, Yj,1, Yj,1, Yj,2, Yj,3, Yj,4), selects two random s1, s2 ∈ Z∗p , computes dk = (Yj,kY−1i,k g−sk)1/(xi−w), sets
the re-encryption key rki,w,j = (dk, sk)k∈{1,2}.• Trapdoor(pki, ski, w): given user i’s pubic key pki and private key ski and a condition w, selects two random s3, s4 ∈ Z∗p ,
computes dk = (Yi,kg−sk)1/(xi−w), sets the trapdoor Ti,w = (dk, sk)k∈{3,4}.
• Enc1(pki,m): To encrypt a message m ∈ M under the public key pki. Picks random R ∈ G∗2 and svk ∈ {0, 1}k1 , sets
C0 = svk and r = H1(m, R), computes C2 = e(g, g)r , C4 = m⊕ H2(R),
φ′ = H0(C0, C2, C4), C3 = e(g, Yi,1)rφ′e(g, Yi,2)rR
outputs the first level ciphertext CTi = (C0, C2, C3, C4).• Enc2(pki,m, w): To encrypt a messagem ∈M under the public key pki and conditionw ∈ W , do the following.
(1) Selects a one-time signature key pair (ssk, svk)← G(λ) and sets C0 = svk.
(2) Picks R ∈ G∗2 , computes r = H1(m, R), and
C1 = (Xig−w)r , C2 = e(g, g)r , C4 = m⊕ H2(R)
φ′ = H0(C0, C2, C4), C3 = e(g, Yi,1)rφ′e(g, Yi,2)rR
φ = H3(C0, C1, C2, C3, C4), C5 = e(g, Yi,3)rφe(g, Yi,4)r .
(3) Generates a one-time signature σ = S(ssk, (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5)) on the pair (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5).
(4) Then, outputs the second level ciphertext CTi = (C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, σ ).
• Test(CTi, Ti,w): on input of a trapdoor Ti,w = (dk, sk)k={3,4} and a second level ciphertext CTi = (C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, σ ),
it first computes φ = H3(C0, C1, C2, C3, C4), tests if
V(C0, σ , (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5)) = 1 (1)
C5 = e(C1, dφ3d4)C s3φ+s42 . (2)
If one of the checks fails, outputs ‘‘0’’, otherwise it outputs ‘‘1’’.
To verify this, consider the following.
e(C1, d
φ
3d4)C
s3φ+s4
2 = e((Xig−w)r , ((Yi,3g−s3)1/(xi−w))φ((Yi,4g−s4)1/(xi−w)))C s3φ+s42
= e(g(xi−w)r , ((Yi,3g−s3)φ(Yi,4g−s4))1/(xi−w))C s3φ+s42
= e(g r , (Yi,3g−s3)φ(Yi,4g−s4))C s3φ+s42
= e(g r , (Yi,3)φ(Yi,4))e(g r , (g−s3)φ(g−s4))C s3φ+s42
= e(g, Yi,3)rφe(g, Yi,4)r
= C5.
• ReEnc(CTi, rki,w,j): on input of a re-encryption key rki,w,j = (dk, sk)k∈{1,2} and a second level ciphertext CTi =
(C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, σ ). Test if
V(C0, σ , (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5)) = 1. (3)
If Eq. (3) holds, it computes φ′ = H0(C0, C2, C4), CTi, is re-encrypted by computing
C ′3 = e(C1, dφ
′
1 d2)C
s1φ′+s2
2 · C3.
The re-encrypted ciphertext (level 1) is CTj = (C0, C2, C ′3, C4).
To verify this, consider the following.
C ′3 = e(C1, dφ
′
1 d2)C
s1φ′+s2
2 · C3
= e((Xig−w)r , ((Yj,1Y−1i,1 g−s1)1/(xi−w))φ
′
((Yj,2Y−1i,2 g
−s2)1/(xi−w)))C s1φ
′+s2
2 · C3
= e(g(xi−w)r , ((Yj,1Y−1i,1 g−s1)φ
′
(Yj,2Y−1i,2 g
−s2))1/(xi−w))C s1φ
′+s2
2 · C3
= e(g r , ((Yj,1Y−1i,1 g−s1)φ
′
(Yj,2Y−1i,2 g
−s2))C s1φ
′+s2
2 · C3
= e(g r , ((Yj,1Y−1i,1 )φ
′
(Yj,2Y−1i,2 ))e(g
r , (g−s1)φ
′
(g−s2))(e(g, g)r)s1φ
′+s2 · C3
= e(g, Yj,1)rφ′e(g, Yj,2)r(e(g, Yi,1)rφ′e(g, Yi,2)r)−1e(g, Yi,1)rφ′e(g, Yi,2)rR
= e(g, Yj,1)rφ′e(g, Yj,2)rR.
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• Dec1(CTj, skj): On input a secret key skj and a first level ciphertext (re-encrypted ciphertext) CTj = (C0, C2, C3, C4),
it computes φ′ = H0(C0, C2, C4) and R = C3/(C2)yj,1φ′+yj,2 ,m = C4 ⊕ H2(R), r = H1(m, R), and checks whether
C2
?= e(g, g)r holds. If yes, it returnsm; else it returns⊥.
• Dec2(CTi, ski): On input a secret key ski and a second level ciphertext CTi = (C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, σ ), it computes
φ = H3(C0, C1, C2, C3, C4), φ′ = H0(C0, C2, C4) and tests if
V(C0, σ , (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5)) = 1 (4)
C5 = (C2)yi,3φ+yi,4 . (5)
If one of the checks fails, outputs⊥. Otherwise, computes
R = C3/(C2)yi,1φ′+yi,2 , m = C4 ⊕ H2(R), r = H1(m, R)
and checks whether C2
?= e(g, g)r holds. If yes, it returnsm; else it returns⊥.
To verify this, consider the following.
(C2)yi,3φ+yi,4 = (e(g, g)r)yi,3φ+yi,4
= C5.
C3/(C2)yi,1φ
′+yi,2 = (e(g, Yi,1)rφ′e(g, Yi,2)rR)/(e(g, g)r)yi,1φ′+yi,2
= R.
3.2. Security of our C-PRES
In this subsection,we prove the C-PRES-IND-ANON-CCA security for our scheme in the randomoraclemodel. The analysis
of Game 1, Game 2 and Game 3 is as follows.
Theorem 1. If the q-ABDHE and DBDH assumptions hold, and sig = (G, S,V) is a strongly unforgeable one-time signature, then
the scheme is C-PRES-IND-ANON-CCA secure in the random oracle model.
Lemma 1. If there exists an IND-ANON adversary A against our scheme, then there exists an algorithm B which can solve the
q-ABDHE problem for q ≥ qk + 1, where qk is the number of re-encryption key and trapdoor queries.
Proof. Our approach to proving Lemma 1 closely follows the proof of security for Gentry’s IBE scheme [18]. Suppose there
exists a polynomial-time adversary, A, that can attack our scheme in the random oracle model. Let qk be the number of
re-encryption key queries. We build a simulator B that can play a q-ABDHE game for q ≥ qk + 1. In the following, we call
HU the set of honest parties, and CU the set of corrupt parties. The simulation proceeds as follows:
We let the challenger set the groups G1 and G2 with an efficient bilinear map e and a generator g of G1. Simulator B
inputs a q-ABDHE instance (g, gx, gx
2
, . . . , gx
q
, gz, gzx
q+2
, T ), and has to distinguish T = e(g, g)zxq+1 from a random element
in G2.
Before describing B, we first define an event FOTS and bound its probability to occur. Let C∗ = (svk∗, C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 ,
C∗5 , σ ∗) denote the challenge ciphertext given to A in the game. Let FOTS be the event that A issues a test or re-encryption
query for ciphertext C∗ = (svk∗, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, σ ) but V(svk∗, σ , (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5)) = 1. In the ‘‘phase 1’’ stage,A has
simply no information on svk∗. Hence, the probability of a pre-challenge occurrence of FOTS does not exceed qtθ if qt is the
overall number of re-encryption and test oracle queries and θ denotes the maximal probability (which by assumption does
not exceed 1/p) that any one-time verification key svk∗ is output by G. In the ‘‘phase 2’’ stage, FOTS clearly gives rise to an
algorithm breaking the strong unforgeability of the one-time signature. Therefore, the probability Pr[FOTS] ≤ qt/p+AdvOTS ,
where the second term accounts for the fact that the probability of definition one time signature, must be negligible by
assumption.
The random oracles H0, H1, H2, and H3 are controlled byB as follows.
If A queries (C0, C2, C4) to the random oracle H0, B searches HList0 for an entry (C0, C2, C4, ψ
′). If it exists, return ψ ′ as
answer. Otherwise, it chooses ψ ′ ∈ Z∗p at random and returns it as the answer and places (C0, C2, C4, ψ ′) into HList0 .
If A queries (m, R) to the random oracle H1, B searches HList1 for an entry (m, R, r). If it exists, return r as answer.
Otherwise, it chooses r ∈ Z∗p at random and returns it as the answer and places (m, R, r) into HList1 .
IfA queries (R) to the random oracle H2,B searches HList2 for an entry (R, ω). If it exists, return ω as answer. Otherwise,
it chooses ω ∈ {0, 1}k at random and returns it as the answer and places (R, ω) into HList2 .
If A queries (C0, C1, C2, C3, C4) to the random oracle H3, B searches HList3 for an entry (C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, ψ). If it exists,
return ψ as answer. Otherwise, it chooses ψ ∈ Z∗p at random and returns it as the answer and places (C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, ψ)
into HList3 .
(1) Setup: Let λ be the security parameter and (p, g,G1,G2, e) be the bilinear map parameters. Let message space be
M = {0, 1}k and condition space beW = Z∗p . The global system parameters are (p, g,G1,G2, e, k,H0,H1,H2,H3, sig).
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(2) Query phase 1.Amakes the following queries:
• Uncorrupted key generation query ⟨i⟩: public keys of honest user i ∈ HU are defined as follows:B selects a random
value ηi ∈ Z∗p , computes Xi = gx+ηi , B picks four random degree q polynomials fi,k(X) where k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, and
defines {Yi,k = g fi,k(x)}k∈{1,2,3,4}. This implicitly defines the secret key value as xi = x+ ηi, {yi,k = fi,k(x)}k∈{1,2,3,4}.B
sets target user’s public key as pki∗ = (Xi, {Yi,k}k∈{1,2,3,4}), and sends public key toA.
• Corrupted key generation query ⟨i⟩: Public keys of corrupt user i ∈ CU are the same as the key generation algorithm,
this means the simulatorB can know both the public key and secret key of user i ∈ CU , and then sends (pki, ski) to
A.
• Re-encryption key query ⟨pki, w, pkj⟩:B has to distinguish several situations:
(a) If i ∈ CU , sinceB can know the secret key part xi for user i, soB can compute it correctly.
(b) If i ∈ HU and j ∈ CU , let Fi,j,k(X) = yj,k − fi,k(X), computes
sw,k = Fi,j,k(w − ηi), dw,k = g(Fi,j,k(x)−Fi,j,k(w−ηi))/(x+ηi−w).
(c) If i ∈ HU and j ∈ HU , let Fi,j,k(X) = fj,k(X)− fi,k(X), thenB computes
sw,k = Fi,j,k(w − ηi), dw,k = g(Fi,j,k(x)−Fi,j,k(w−ηi))/(x+ηi−w).
Clearly, it is easy to compute dw,k using the Lagrange form of Taylor’s theorem [2]. When q ≥ qk + 1,
fi,k(w − ηi), fj,k(w− ηi) are random values fromA’s view, since fi,k(X) and fj,k(X) are random degree q polynomials.
Sends the re-encryption key rki,w,j = {dw,k, sw,k}k∈{1,2} toA.
• Trapdoor query ⟨pki, w⟩:B has to distinguish several situations:
(a) If i ∈ CU , sinceB can know the secret key part xi for user i, soB can compute it correctly.
(b) If i ∈ HU , thenB computes
{sw,k = fi,k(w − ηi)}k∈{3,4}, dw,k = g(fi,k(x)−fi,k(w−ηi))/(x+ηi−w).
When q ≥ qk+ 1, {fi,k(w − ηi)}k∈{3,4} are random values fromA’s view, since fi,k(X)where k ∈ {3, 4} are random
degree q polynomials.
Sends the trapdoor Ti,w = {dw,k, sw,k}k∈{3,4} toA.
• Test query⟨pki, w, CTi⟩:A can adaptively askB for the test query for public key pki, any keywordw and any ciphertext
of his choice. If FOTS occurs, the process halts (an occurrence of FOTS in phase 1 is different from that in phase 2 as
discussed in the preparation phase). If FOTS does not occur, B first queries a trapdoor query on ⟨pki, w⟩ to get the
trapdoor Ti,w and then responds the result Test(CTi, Ti,w) toA.
• Re-encryption query ⟨pki, pkj, w, CTi⟩: If FOTS occurs, the process halts. If FOTS does not occur, since B can compute
unidirectional re-encryption key rki,w,j for all user i and j, soB can compute it correctly.
• Decryption query ⟨pkj, CTj⟩: If ⟨pkj, CTj⟩ denotes the queries on re-encrypted ciphertext (first level ciphertext),
CTj = (C0, C2, C3, C4). For a user’s j ∈ CU , B can decrypt it correctly, since B knows the secret key for user j ∈ CU .
For a user’s j ∈ HU , then B searches HList0 , HList1 and HList2 to see whether there exist a tuple (C0, C2, C4, φ′), a tuple
(m, R, r) and a tuple (R, ω) such that
C2 = e(g, g)r , C3 = e(g, Yj,1)rφ′e(g, Yj,2)rR, C4 = m⊕ H2(R).
If yes, it outputsm toA; else outputs⊥.
• Decryption query⟨pki, w, CTi⟩: If ⟨pki, w, CTi⟩ denotes the queries on second level ciphertext CTi. B makes a re-
encryption query on ⟨pki, pkj, w, CTi⟩ to get the re-encrypted ciphertext (first level ciphertext) CTj, then makes a
decryption query on ⟨pkj, CTj⟩, and sends the result toA.
(3) Challenge. OnceAdecides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs a target public key pki∗ , a conditionpair (w0, w1) and aplaintext
m.B responds by choosing a random β ∈ {0, 1}, sets {s∗wβ ,k = fi∗,k(wβ − ηi∗)}k∈{1,2,3,4}, thenB computes
d∗wβ ,k = g(fi∗,k(x)−fi∗,k(wβ−ηi∗ ))/(x+ηi∗−wβ )
where k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.B also selects a strongly unforgeable one-time signature key pair (ssk∗, svk∗)← G(λ), and sets
C∗0 = svk∗.
Define the degree q+ 1 polynomial
F∗(X) = (Xq+2 − (wβ − ηi∗)q+2)/(X + ηi∗ − wβ) =
q+1
i=0
(F∗i X
i).
Picks random R∗ ∈ G∗2 and computes
C∗1 = gzx
q+2
(gz)−(wβ−ηi∗ )
q+2
C∗2 = T F
∗
q+1e

gz,
q
i=0
(gx
i
)F
∗
i

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C∗4 = m⊕ H2(R∗)
φ′∗ = H0(C∗0 , C∗2 , C∗4 )
C∗3 = R∗ · e(C∗1 , (d∗wβ ,1)φ
′∗
d∗wβ ,2) · (C∗2 )
s∗
wβ ,1
φ′∗+s∗
wβ ,2
φ∗ = H3(C∗0 , C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 )
C∗5 = e(C∗1 , (d∗wβ ,3)φ
∗
d∗wβ ,4) · (C∗2 )
s∗
wβ ,3
φ∗+s∗
wβ ,4 .
Generates a strongly unforgeable one-time signature σ ∗ = S(ssk∗, (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 , C∗5 )). Sends the challenge
ciphertext C∗ = (C∗0 , C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 , C∗5 , σ ∗) toA.
To see this, implicitly let H1(m, R∗) = r∗ = zF∗(x), if T = e(g, g)zxq+1 , then C∗1 = g(x+ηi∗−wβ )r∗ = (Xi∗g−wβ )r∗ ,
C∗2 = e(g, g)r∗ , C∗3 = R∗ · e(g, Yi∗,1)φ′
∗r∗e(g, Yi∗,2)r
∗
and C∗5 = e(g, Yi∗,3)φ∗r∗e(g, Yi∗,4)r∗ .
(4) Query phase 2.A continues making queries as in the query phase 1.
(5) Guess.A outputs the guess β ′, if β ′ = β , then output 1 meaning T = e(g, g)zxq+1 ; else output 0 meaning T = e(g, g)r .
Probability analysis: When FOTS does not occur, if T = e(g, g)zxq+1 , then the simulation is perfect, andAwill guess the bit β
correctly with probability 1/2 + ϵ. Else, T is uniformly random, and thus (C∗1 , C∗2 ) is a uniformly random and independent
element. In this case, the inequality C∗2 ≠ e(C∗1 , g)1/(x+ηi∗−wβ ) holds with probability 1 − 1/p. When this inequality holds,
the value of
K ∗ = e(C∗1 , (d∗wβ ,1)φ
′∗
d∗wβ ,2) · (C∗2 )
s∗
wβ ,1
φ′∗+s∗
wβ ,2 (6)
= e(C∗1 , (Yφ
′∗
i∗,1Yi∗,2)
1/(x+ηi∗−wβ ))

C∗2
e((C∗1 , g)
1/(x+ηi∗−wβ ))
s∗
wβ ,1
φ′∗+s∗
wβ ,2
(7)
is uniformly random and independent from A’s view (except for the value C∗3 ), since s
∗
wβ ,k
(when q ≥ qk +
1, {s∗wβ ,k = fi,k(wβ − ηi∗)} is a random value from A’s view). Thus, C∗3 is uniformly random and independent, and
(C∗1 , C
∗
2 , C
∗
3 , C
∗
4 ) can reveal no information regarding the random bit β . Similarly,
C∗5 = e(C∗1 , (Yφ
∗
i∗,3Yi∗,4)
1/(x+ηi∗−wβ ))

C∗2
e((C∗1 , g)
1/(x+ηi∗−wβ ))
s∗
wβ ,3
φ∗+s∗
wβ ,4
(8)
thus C∗5 will not leak the bit β .
Finally, we still need to explain why the re-encryption and test queries do not jeopardize the security of the scheme.
For the re-encryption query, we need to prove the re-encryption query on ⟨pki, pkj, w, CTi⟩ where CTi = (C0, C1, C2, C3,
C4, C5, σ ) and V(C0, σ , (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5)) = 1 is a mauling of the challenge ciphertext may not leak the bit β .
Querying valid ciphertexts where C2 = e(C1, g)1/(x+ηi−w) to re-encryption oracle does not help A distinguish between
the simulation and the actual construction, because of the correctness of re-encryption. For invalid ciphertexts where
C2 ≠ e(C1, g)1/(x+ηi−w), the ciphertext will be re-encrypted by
C ′3 = C3 · e(C1, dφ
′
w,1dw,2)C
sw,1φ′+sw,2
2
= C3 · e(C1, ((Yj,1Y−1i,1 )φ
′
(Yj,2Y−1i,2 ))
1/(x+ηi−w))

C2
e((C1, g)1/(x+ηi−w))
sw,1φ′+sw,2
.
When C3 ≠ C∗3 , since sw,k is uniformly random and independent from A’s view, then the re-encryption result C ′3 is a
random value fromA’s view. Thus it will not leak the bit β .
When C3 = C∗3 , we have
C ′3 = R∗e(C∗1 , (Yφ
′∗
i∗,1Yi∗,2)
1/(x+ηi∗−wβ ))

C∗2
e((C∗1 , g)
1/(x+ηi∗−wβ ))
s∗
wβ ,1
φ′∗+s∗
wβ ,2
· e(C1, ((Yj,1Y−1i,1 )φ
′
(Yj,2Y−1i,2 ))
1/(x+ηi−w))

C2
e((C1, g)1/(x+ηi−w))
sw,1φ′+sw,2
.
If C1 ≠ C∗1 or C2 ≠ C∗2 or w ≠ wβ or ηi ≠ ηi∗ , since s∗wβ ,k is uniformly random and independent fromA’s view, then the
re-encryption result C ′3 is a random value fromA’s view. Thus it will not leak the bit β .
If C1 = C∗1 , C2 = C∗2 ,w = wβ , ηi = ηi∗ and C3 = C∗3 , this situation can be discussed in two cases:
• If C0 = svk ≡ svk∗ = C∗0 , then
(C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, σ ) ≠ (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 , C∗5 , σ ∗)
B is faced with an occurrence of FOTS and halts.
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• If C0 = svk ≠ svk∗ = C∗0 , we have φ ≠ φ∗ and φ′ ≠ φ′∗,
C ′3 = R∗e(C∗1 , (Yφ
′∗
i∗,1Yi∗,2)
1/(x+ηi∗−wβ ))

C∗2
e((C∗1 , g)
1/(x+ηi∗−wβ ))
s∗
wβ ,1
φ′∗+s∗
wβ ,2
· e(C1, ((Yj,1Y−1i,1 )φ
′
(Yj,2Y−1i,2 ))
1/(x+ηi−w))

C∗2
e((C∗1 , g)
1/(x+ηi∗−wβ ))
s∗
wβ ,1
φ′+s∗
wβ ,2
.
Since φ′ ≠ φ′∗, then l = s∗wβ ,1φ′ + s∗wβ ,2 is uniformly random and independent from l∗ = s∗wβ ,1φ′∗ + s∗wβ ,2. Then the
re-encryption result C ′3 is a random value fromA’s view. Thus it will not leak the bit β .
Similarly, we need to prove the test query on ⟨pki, w, CTi⟩ where CTi = (C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, σ ) and
V(C0, σ , (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5)) = 1 is a mauling of the challenge ciphertext may not leak the bit β . If ⟨pki, w⟩ ≠ ⟨pki∗ , w∗⟩,
test querying on this will not help A since A can make the trapdoor query on ⟨pki, w⟩. Querying valid ciphertexts where
C2 = e(C1, g)1/(x+ηi∗−w∗) to test oracle does not helpA to distinguish between the simulation and the actual construction,
due to the correctness of test. For invalid ciphertexts where C2 ≠ e(C1, g)1/(x+ηi∗−w∗), the ciphertext will be verified by the
following equation.
C5 = e(C1, d∗w∗,3φ
′
d∗w∗,4)C
s∗
w∗,3φ
′+s∗
w∗,4
2
= e(C1, ((Yi∗,3g−s
∗
w∗,3)1/(xi∗−w
∗))φ
′
((Yi∗,4g
−s∗
w∗,4)1/(xi∗−w
∗)))C
s∗
w∗,3φ
′+s∗
w∗,4
2
= e(C1, (Yφ′i∗,3Yi∗,4)1/(x+ηi∗−w
∗))

C2
e((C1, g)1/(x+ηi∗−w
∗))
s∗
w∗,3φ
′+s∗
w∗,4
.
Similarly from the challenge ciphertext, we have
C∗5 = e(C∗1 , d∗wβ ,3φ
′
d∗wβ ,4)C
s∗
wβ ,3
φ′+s∗
wβ ,4
2
= e(C∗1 , ((Yi∗,3g
−s∗
wβ ,3)1/(xi∗−wβ ))φ
′
((Yi∗,4g
−s∗
wβ ,4)1/(xi∗−wβ )))(C∗2 )
s∗
wβ ,3
φ′+s∗
wβ ,4
= e(C∗1 , (Yφ
′
i∗,3Yi∗,4)
1/(x+ηi∗−wβ ))

C∗2
e((C∗1 , g)
1/(x+ηi∗−wβ ))
s∗
wβ ,3
φ′+s∗
wβ ,4
.
This scenario can be divided into two cases:
• If C0 = svk ≡ svk∗ = C∗0 , then
(C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, σ ) ≠ (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 , C∗5 , σ ∗)
B is faced with an occurrence of FOTS and halts.• If C0 = svk ≠ svk∗ = C∗0 , we have φ′ ≠ φ′∗. If w∗ ≠ wβ , since s∗w∗,3 and s∗w∗,4 are uniformly random and independent
fromA’s view, then it will not leak the bit β . Ifw∗ = wβ , then l = s∗wβ ,3φ′+ s∗wβ ,4 is uniformly random and independent
from l∗ = s∗wβ ,3φ′∗ + s∗wβ ,4. Then the test result will not leak the bit β , since s∗wβ ,3 and s∗wβ ,4 are uniformly random
and independent from A’s view. Actually, the test query will always output ‘‘0’’ since the valid C5 which is hidden by
l = s∗wβ ,3φ′ + s∗wβ ,4 is a random value fromA’s view.
This completes the proof of Lemma 1. 
Lemma 2. If there exists an IND-L2-CCA adversaryA against our scheme, then there exists an algorithm B which can solve the
q-ABDHE problem for q ≥ qk + 1, where qk is the number of re-encryption key and trapdoor queries.
Proof. Our approach to proving Lemma 2 closely follows the proof of Lemma 1. Suppose there exists a polynomial-time
adversary,A, that can attack our scheme in the random oracle model. Let qk is the number of re-encryption key queries. We
build a simulatorB that can play a q-ABDHE game for q ≥ qk+ 1. In the following, we call HU the set of honest parties, and
CU the set of corrupt parties. The simulation proceeds as follows:
We let the challenger set the groups G1 and G2 with an efficient bilinear map e and a generator g of G1. Simulator B
inputs a q-ABDHE instance (g, gx, gx
2
, . . . , gx
q
, gz, gzx
q+2
, T ), and has to distinguish T = e(g, g)zxq+1 from a random element
in G2.
The random oracles H0, H1, H2, and H3 controlled byB are the same as in Lemma 1.
(1) Setup: Let λ be the security parameter and (p, g,G1,G2, e) be the bilinear map parameters. Let message space be
M = {0, 1}k and condition space beW = Z∗p . The global system parameters are (p, g,G1,G2, e, k,H0,H1,H2,
H3, sig).
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(2) Query phase 1.Amakes the following queries:
• Uncorrupted key generation query ⟨i⟩: public keys of honest user i ∈ HU are defined as the following: B selects a
random value ηi ∈ Z∗p , computes Xi = gx+ηi ,B picks four random degree q polynomials fi,k(X)where k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4},
and defines {Yi,k = g fi,k(x)}k∈{1,2,3,4}. This implicitly defines the secret key value as xi = x+ηi, {yi,k = fi,k(x)}k∈{1,2,3,4}.
B sets target user’s public key as pki∗ = (Xi, {Yi,k}k∈{1,2,3,4}), and sends public key toA.
• Corrupted key generation query ⟨i⟩: Public keys of corrupt user i ∈ CU are the same as the key generation algorithm,
this means the simulatorB can know the both the public key and secret key of user i ∈ CU , and then sends (pki, ski)
toA.
• Re-encryption key query⟨pki, w, pkj⟩:B has to distinguish several situations:
(a) If i ∈ CU , sinceB can know the secret key part xi for user i, soB can compute it correctly.
(b) If i ∈ HU and j ∈ CU , let Fi,j,k(X) = yj,k − fi,k(X), computes
sw,k = Fi,j,k(w − ηi), dw,k = g(Fi,j,k(x)−Fi,j,k(w−ηi))/(x+ηi−w).
(c) If i ∈ HU and j ∈ HU , let Fi,j,k(X) = fj,k(X)− fi,k(X), thenB computes
sw,k = Fi,j,k(w − ηi), dw,k = g(Fi,j,k(x)−Fi,j,k(w−ηi))/(x+ηi−w).
When q ≥ qk + 1, fi,k(w − ηi), fj,k(w − ηi) are random values fromA’s view, since fi,k(X) and fj,k(X) are random
degree q polynomials.
Sends the re-encryption key rki,w,j = {dw,k, sw,k}k∈{1,2} toA.
• Trapdoor query ⟨pki, w⟩:B has to distinguish several situations:
(a) If i ∈ CU , sinceB can know the secret key part xi for user i, soB can compute it correctly.
(b) If i ∈ HU , thenB computes
{sw,k = fi,k(w − ηi)}k∈{3,4}, dw,k = g(fi,k(x)−fi,k(w−ηi))/(x+ηi−w).
When q ≥ qk+ 1, {fi,k(w − ηi)}k∈{3,4} are random values fromA’s view, since fi,k(X)where k ∈ {3, 4} are random
degree q polynomials.
Sends the trapdoor Ti,w = {dw,k, sw,k}k∈{3,4} toA.
• Test query ⟨pki, w, CTi⟩: A can adaptively ask B for the test query for public key pki, any keyword w and any
ciphertext of his choice. B first query a trapdoor query on ⟨pki, w⟩ to get the trapdoor Ti,w and then responds the
result Test(CTi, Ti,w) toA.
• Re-encryption query ⟨pki, pkj, w, CTi⟩: SinceB can compute unidirectional re-encryption key rki,w,j and the trapdoor
Ti,w = {dw,k, sw,k}k∈{1,2} for all user i and j, soB can compute it correctly.
• Decryption query ⟨pkj, CTj⟩: If ⟨pkj, CTj⟩ denotes the queries on re-encrypted ciphertext (first level ciphertext),
CTj = (C0, C2, C3, C4). For a user’s j ∈ CU , B can decrypt it correctly, since B knows the secret key for user j ∈ CU .
For a user’s j ∈ HU , then B searches for HList0 , HList1 and HList2 to see whether there exists a tuple (C0, C2, C4, φ′), a
tuple (m, R, r) and a tuple (R, ω) such that
C2 = e(g, g)r , C3 = e(g, Yj,1)rφ′e(g, Yj,2)rR, C4 = m⊕ H2(R).
If yes, it outputsm toA; else it outputs⊥.
• Decryption query⟨pki, w, CTi⟩: If ⟨pki, w, CTi⟩ denotes the queries on second level ciphertext CTi. B makes a re-
encryption query on ⟨pki, pkj, w, CTi⟩ to get the re-encrypted ciphertext (first level ciphertext) CTj, then makes a
decryption query on ⟨pkj, CTj⟩, and sends the result toA.
(3) Challenge. Once A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs a target public key pki∗ , a condition pair w∗ and two equal
length plaintexts (m0,m1).B responds by choosing a random β ∈ {0, 1}, sets {s∗w∗,k = fi∗,k(w∗ − ηi∗)}k∈{1,2,3,4}, thenB
computes
d∗w∗,k = g(fi∗,k(x)−fi∗,k(w
∗−ηi∗ ))/(x+ηi∗−w∗)
where k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. B also selects a strongly unforgeable one-time signature key pair (ssk∗, svk∗) ← G(λ) , sets
C∗0 = svk∗.
Define the degree q+ 1 polynomial
F∗(X) = (Xq+2 − (w∗ − ηi∗)q+2)/(X + ηi∗ − w∗) =
q+1
i=0
(F∗i X
i).
Picks random R∗ ∈ G∗2 and computes
C∗1 = gzx
q+2
(gz)−(w
∗−ηi∗ )q+2
C∗2 = T F
∗
q+1e

gz,
q
i=0
(gx
i
)F
∗
i

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C∗4 = mβ ⊕ H2(R∗)
φ′∗ = H0(C∗0 , C∗2 , C∗4 )
C∗3 = R∗ · e(C∗1 , (d∗w∗,1)φ
′∗
d∗w∗,2) · (C∗2 )s
∗
w∗,1φ
′∗+s∗
w∗,2
φ∗ = H3(C∗0 , C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 )
C∗5 = e(C∗1 , (d∗w∗,3)φ
∗
d∗w∗,4) · (C∗2 )s
∗
w∗,3φ
∗+s∗
w∗,4 .
Generates a strongly unforgeable one-time signature σ ∗ = S(ssk∗, (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 , C∗5 )). Sends the challenge
ciphertext C∗ = (C∗0 , C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 , C∗5 , σ ∗) toA.
To see this, implicitly let H1(mβ , R∗) = r∗ = zF∗(x), if T = e(g, g)zxq+1 , then C∗1 = g(x+ηi∗−w∗)r∗ = (Xi∗g−w∗)r∗ ,
C∗2 = e(g, g)r∗ , C∗3 = R∗ · e(g, Yi∗,1)φ′
∗r∗e(g, Yi∗,2)r
∗
and C∗5 = e(g, Yi∗,3)φ∗r∗e(g, Yi∗,4)r∗ .
(4) Query phase 2.A continues making queries as in the query phase 1.
(5) Guess.A outputs the guess β ′, if β ′ = β , then output 1 meaning T = e(g, g)zxq+1 ; else output 0 meaning T = e(g, g)r .
Probability Analysis: Similar to the analysis in Game 1, when FOTS does not occur, if T = e(g, g)zxq+1 , then the simulation
is perfect, and A will guess the bit β correctly with probability 1/2 + ϵ. Else, T is uniformly random, and thus (C∗1 , C∗2 ) is
a uniformly random and independent element. In this case, the inequality C∗2 ≠ e(C∗1 , g)1/(x+ηi∗−w∗) holds with probability
1− 1/p. When the inequality holds, the value of
K ∗ = e(C∗1 , (d∗w∗,1)φ
′∗
d∗w∗,2) · (C∗2 )s
∗
w∗,1φ
′∗+s∗
w∗,2 (9)
= e(C∗1 , (Yφ
′∗
i∗,1Yi∗,2)
1/(x+ηi∗−w∗))

C∗2
e((C∗1 , g)1/(x+ηi∗−w
∗))
s∗
w∗,1φ
′∗+s∗
w∗,2
(10)
is uniformly random and independent from A’s view (except for the value C∗3 ), since s
∗
w∗,k (when q ≥ qk + 1,{s∗w∗,k = fi,k(w∗ − ηi∗)} is a random value fromA’s view). Thus, C∗3 is uniformly random and independent, and (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 )
can reveal no information regarding the random value R∗. Thus, C∗4 will not leak the bit β . Similarly,
C∗5 = e(C∗1 , (Yφ
∗
i∗,3Yi∗,4)
1/(x+ηi∗−w∗))

C∗2
e((C∗1 , g)1/(x+ηi∗−w
∗))
s∗
w∗,3φ
∗+s∗
w∗,4
thus C∗5 will not leak the bit β . Finally, we need to prove the re-encryption query on ⟨pki, pkj, w, CTi⟩ where CTi =
(C0, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, σ ) andV(C0, σ , (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5)) = 1 is a mauling of the challenge ciphertext may not leak the bit
β . Querying valid ciphertexts where C2 = e(C1, g)1/(x+ηi−w) to re-encryption oracle does not help A distinguish between
the simulation and the actual construction, because of the correctness of the re-encryption. For invalid ciphertexts where
C2 ≠ e(C1, g)1/(x+ηi−w), the ciphertext will be re-encrypted by
C ′3 = C3 · e(C1, dφ
′
w,1dw,2)C
sw,1φ′+sw,2
2
= C3 · e(C1, ((Yj,1Y−1i,1 )φ
′
(Yj,2Y−1i,2 ))
1/(x+ηi−w))

C2
e((C1, g)1/(x+ηi−w))
sw,1φ′+sw,2
.
When C3 ≠ C∗3 , since sw,k is uniformly random and independent from A’s view, then the re-encryption result C ′3 is a
random value fromA’s view. Thus it will not leak the bit β .
When C3 = C∗3 , we have
C ′3 = R∗e(C∗1 , (Yφ
′∗
i∗,1Yi∗,2)
1/(x+ηi∗−w∗))

C∗2
e((C∗1 , g)1/(x+ηi∗−w
∗))
s∗
w∗,1φ
′∗+s∗
w∗,2
· e(C1, ((Yj,1Y−1i,1 )φ
′
(Yj,2Y−1i,2 ))
1/(x+ηi−w))

C2
e((C1, g)1/(x+ηi−w))
sw,1φ′+sw,2
.
If C1 ≠ C∗1 or C2 ≠ C∗2 or w ≠ w∗ or ηi ≠ ηi∗ , since s∗w∗,k is uniformly random and independent fromA’s view, then the
re-encryption result C ′3 is a random value fromA’s view. Thus it will not leak the bit β .
If C1 = C∗1 , C2 = C∗2 ,w = w∗, ηi = ηi∗ and C3 = C∗3 , this situation can be discussed in two cases:
• If C0 = svk ≡ svk∗ = C∗0 , then
(C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, σ ) ≠ (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 , C∗5 , σ ∗)
B is faced with an occurrence of FOTS and halts.
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• If C0 = svk ≠ svk∗ = C∗0 , we have φ ≠ φ∗ and φ′ ≠ φ′∗,
C ′3 = R∗e(C∗1 , (Yφ
′∗
i∗,1Yi∗,2)
1/(x+ηi∗−w∗))

C∗2
e((C∗1 , g)1/(x+ηi∗−w
∗))
s∗
w∗,1φ
′∗+s∗
w∗,2
· e(C1, ((Yj,1Y−1i,1 )φ
′
(Yj,2Y−1i,2 ))
1/(x+ηi−w))

C∗2
e((C∗1 , g)1/(x+ηi∗−w
∗))
s∗
w∗,1φ
′+s∗
w∗,2
.
Since φ′ ≠ φ′∗, then l = s∗w∗,1φ′+ s∗w∗,2 is uniformly random and independent from l∗ = s∗w∗,1φ′∗+ s∗w∗,2. Thus it will
not leak the bit β .
This completes the proof of Lemma 2. 
Lemma 3. If there exists an IND-L1-CCA adversaryA against our scheme, then there exists an algorithmB , which can solve the
DBDH problem.
Proof. In our scheme, the challenge ciphertext of non-transformable ciphertext security is the same as the transformed
ciphertext security. Therefore, without losing generality, we only consider the proof of the non-transformable ciphertext
security. We first let the challenger set the groups G1 and G2 with an efficient bilinear map e and a generator g of G1.
SimulatorB inputs a DBDH instance (g, ga, gb, gc, T ), and has to distinguish T = e(g, g)abc from a random element in G2.
The random oracles H0, H1, H2, and H3 controlled byB are the same as those in Lemma 1.
(1) Setup: Let λ be the security parameter and (p, g,G1,G2, e) be the bilinear map parameters. Let message space be
M = {0, 1}k and condition space beW = Z∗p . The global system parameters are (p, g,G1,G2, e, k, H0,H1,H2,H3, sig).
(2) Query phase 1.Amakes the following queries:
• Uncorrupted key generation query ⟨i⟩: public keys of honest user i ∈ HU are defined as the following: B selects a
random value xi, ηi,1, ηi,2, yi,3, yi,4 ∈ Z∗p , computes Xi = gxi , Yi,k = ga+ηi,k . This implicitly defines the secret key value
as xi = xi, {yi,k = a + ηi,k}k∈{1,2,3,4}. B sets target user’s public key as pki∗ = (Xi, {Yi,k}k∈{1,2,3,4}), and sends public
key toA.
• Corrupted key generation query ⟨i⟩: Public keys of corrupt user i ∈ CU are the same as the key generation algorithm,
this means the simulatorB can know the both the public key and secret key of user i ∈ CU , and then sends (pki, ski)
toA.
• Re-encryption key query ⟨pki, w, pkj⟩: sinceB can know the secret key part xi for user i,B can compute it correctly.
Sends the re-encryption key rki,w,j = {dw,k, sw,k}k∈{1,2} toA.
• Trapdoor query ⟨pki, w⟩: since B can know the secret key part xi for user i, B can compute it correctly. Sends the
trapdoor Ti,w = {dw,k, sw,k}k∈{3,4} toA.
• Decryption query⟨pkj, CTj⟩: If ⟨pkj, CTj⟩ denote the queries on re-encrypted ciphertext (second level ciphertext),
CTj = (C0, C2, C3, C4). For a user’s j ∈ CU , B can decrypt it correct, since B knows the secret key for user j ∈ CU .
For a user’s j ∈ HU , For a user’s j ∈ HU , then B searches for HList0 , HList1 and HList2 to see whether there exists a tuple
(C0, C2, C4, φ′), a tuple (m, R, r) and a tuple (R, ω) such that
C2 = e(g, g)r , C3 = e(g, Yj,1)rφ′e(g, Yj,2)rR, C4 = m⊕ H2(R).
If yes, it outputsm toA; else it outputs⊥.
(3) Challenge. Once A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs a target public key pki∗ , and two equal length plaintexts
(m0,m1).B responds by choosing a random β ∈ {0, 1}, picks R∗ ∈ G∗2 , C∗0 ∈ {0, 1}k1 and computes
C∗2 = e(gb, gc), C∗4 = mβ ⊕ H2(R∗).
φ′∗ = H0(C∗0 , C∗2 , C∗4 ), C∗3 = (T )(φ
′∗+1) · e(gb, gc)(ηi∗,1φ′∗+ηi∗,2)R∗.
To see this, let H1(mβ , R∗) = r∗ = bc , if T = e(g, g)abc , then
C∗2 = e(gb, gc) = e(g, g)r
∗
C∗3 = (e(g, g)abc)(φ
′∗+1) · e(gb, gc)(ηi∗,1φ′∗+ηi∗,2)R∗
= e(g, g)(a+ηi∗,1)bcφ′∗e(g, g)(a+ηi∗,2)bcR∗ = e(g, Yi∗,1)r∗φ′∗e(g, Yi∗,2)r∗R∗.
(4) Query phase 2.A continues making queries as in the query phase 1.
(5) Guess.A outputs the guess β ′, if β ′ = β , then output 1 meaning T = e(g, g)abc ; else output 0 meaning T = e(g, g)r .
Probability analysis: Suppose there exists a polynomial-time adversary, A, in Game 2 that can attack our scheme with an
advantage ε. Now we provide the probability of the simulatorB:
When T = e(g, g)abc then A must satisfy |Pr[β ′ = β] − 1/2| ≥ ε. When T is uniform in G2, R∗ and C∗3 are uniformly
random and independent, then Pr[β ′ = β] = 1/2. Therefore, when a, b, c are uniform in Z∗p and T is uniform in G2, we
have that |Pr[B(g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) = 1] − Pr[B(g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)r) = 1]| ≥ |(1/2 ± ε) − 1/2| = ε as required.
This completes the proof of Lemma 3. 
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Table 1
Comparison among various C-PRE and PRES schemes.
Scheme WYTDB [34] SCLL [31] Ours
Cost
Enc1 3te 4te + 2tp + ts 2.5te
Enc2 3te + 1tp 4te + 2tp + ts 5.5te + ts
ReEnc 3tp te + 4tp + tv 2te + tp + tv
Dec1 2te + 1tp te + 5tp + tv 2te
Dec2 2te + 3tp te + 5tp + tv 3te + tv
Length
pk 1|G1| + 1|G2| 1|G1| 5|G1| + 1|G2|
sk 1|Z∗p | 1|Z∗p | 5|Z∗p |
Level1 2|G1| + |G2| + |M| |svk| + 3|G1| + 2|G2| + |σ | |svk| + 2|G2| + |M|
Level2 2|G1| + |G2| + |M| + |W | |svk| + 3|G1| + 2|G2| + |σ | |svk| + |G1| + 3|G2| + |M| + |σ |
ReKey 2|G1| |Z∗p | 2|G1| + 2|Z∗p |
Trapdoor – |G1| 2|G1| + 2|Z∗p |
Security CCA CCA CCA
ROM Yes Yes Yes
Keyword search No Yes Yes
Anonymity No Yes Yes
Unidirectionality Yes No Yes
Collusion-resistant Yes No Yes
4. Performance comparison
In this section, we compare our schemes with Shao et al.’s proposed bidirectional proxy re-encryption with keyword
search scheme (we denote it as SCLL) [31] and Weng et al.’s proposed CCA secure C-PRE (we denote it as WYTDB) [34].
Since Weng et al.’s first C-PRE (WDCL) [33] is not CCA secure and Weng et al.’s proposed CCA secure C-PRE is the most
efficient scheme in the known C-PRE, we only include WYTDB for our comparison. Let |M|, |G1|, |G2|, |svk| and |σ | denote
the bit-length of a plaintext, an element in groups G1 and G2, the verification key and signature of one-time signature,
respectively. We denote tp, te, ts, and tv as the computational cost of a bilinear pairings, an exponentiation over a bilinear
group, a one-time signature and verification, respectively. Notice that encryption in our scheme does not require any pairing
computations once e(g, g) and e(g, Yi,k) have been viewed as public key. Let G1 and G2 be the bilinear groups and svk and
σ be the one-time signatures public key and signature. The result of the comparison is outlined in Table 1.
From Table 1, it is observed that our C-PRES from Section 3 outperforms Shao et al.’s PRES scheme (SCLL) in terms of both
computational and communication costs. Furthermore, ours is collusion resistant as well as it is a conditional re-encryption
scheme,while Shao et al.’s PRES scheme is bidirectional only. Our C-PRE is also superior toWeng et al.’s scheme (WYTDB) [34]
in all terms of computation costs. More importantly, our scheme provides anonymity, in contrast to Weng et al.’s scheme.
However, like Weng et al.’s scheme [34], our scheme is limited in that its security relies on the random oracle.
5. Applications of C-PRES
In this section, we provide three applications for C-PRES schemes. We specifically select these applications to
demonstrate how C-PRES schemes can be used to present solutions in these scenarios.
5.1. Application in privacy-preservation of online photo sharing
Online photo sharing is an increasingly popular function of social-networking services, allowing users to share their
photos with family and friends privately. By definition, photo sharing is the process of publishing or transferring a user’s
digital photos online, thus enabling the user to share them with others privately. This function is provided through both
websites and applications that facilitate the upload and display of images. The term can also be loosely applied to the use
of online photo galleries that are set up and managed by individual users. Sharing means that other users can view some of
the pictures according to the access right. It allows users to set up privacy policies to control who can access their photos.
With the increased popularity of mobile devices, such as iPhone and Blackberry, users can comfortably update their photos
wherever they go and the service enables them tonotify their peers automatically, once the peers are authorized by sufficient
access policies. The service enables photo-sharing providers to disseminate users’ photo data in a secure manner, since the
data are actually encrypted. Further, the users can control when or where the data can be viewed by their peers. And the
photo sharing provider can learn nothing about the data of the user including the tag, keyword and content of the photo.
A naive solution could be provided as follows. A user, Alice, could encrypt her photo prior to sending it to the photo
sharing provider, and hence, protecting it from the provider or other adversaries. To enable her peers, Bob and Carol, to
view her photo, Alice can securely disseminate her key to both Bob and Carol. Rather than using a common shared key,
Alice could establish pair-wise secret keys with each of her friends or incorporate asymmetric keys, which both require a
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great deal of additional storage, computation and communication overheads. Hence, although this solution is feasible, this
is impractical.
Furthermore, since the data are actually encrypted, it needs a searchable encryption to ensure that the photo sharing
provider can find the encrypted data (tag or keyword of the photo). We can solve this problem using C-PRES to provide the
solution to the above problem, Alice sends a re-encryption key to Bob to share her locationwith Bob. The re-encryption key is
computed using Bob’s public key and Alice’s private key, and then it is sent to the photo sharing service provider. When Bob
would like to acquire Alice’s location, he will first send a request to the location sharing provider. Then, the photo sharing
provider will retrieve Alice’s last encrypted photo and apply the re-encryption key and policies defined by Alice. Finally,
the photo sharing provider will provide this information to Bob. Upon receiving this information, Bob can then decrypt the
photo.
Alice may only want her families (Charlie) to see her photo when traveling, but she does not want others (David) to do
so. To enable this kind of services, we will do the following.
First, let keyword w = ‘‘Travel′′, and sends the trapdoor TAlice,w and conditional re-encryption key rkAlice,w,Charlie to the
photo sharing provider. Then, the ciphertext containing Alice’s photo, which is encrypted with the keyword w = ‘‘Travel′′
can be re-encrypted by the provider to her families (Charlie) but not to her friends (David). Clearly, the provider can learn
nothing about the user’s data including the tag, keyword and content of the photo. C-PRES, though very efficient, is still
too time-consuming to encrypt large volumes of data. To overcome this, the actual data is encrypted by a more efficient
hybrid encryption scheme, where a secure symmetric encryption (E,D) is selected to be used to encrypt the photo data
under a random key K , and subsequently, the random key K is then encrypted using the C-PRES scheme by Enc2(pki, K , w).
Then, the ciphertext would be in the form of CT = c1||c2 = Enc2(pki, K , w)||EK (m). As discussed in the introduction, if
both encryptions are independent, then the hybrid scheme may not be CCA secure. Clearly, if there is no link between the
symmetric encryption and the second encryption, then the adversary can obtain a new ciphertext by CT ′ = c1||c3 where
c3 is randomly chosen. The adversary can ask for a re-encryption query of CT ′ = c1||c3 for a corrupted delegate, the proxy
will re-encrypt it since the proxy cannot check the validity of the new ciphertext CT ′ = c1||c3. To overcome this issue, we
could include the symmetric encryption of data on input to the hash function as φ′ = H0(C0, C2, C4, EK (m)) and the one
time signature of the symmetric encryption of data.
5.2. Application in personal health record
Consider the scenario in a Personal Health Record (PHR) disclosure. A PHR contains all kinds of health-related information
about an individual (say, Alice). For example, a PHR contains medical history that includes surgery, illness, laboratory
test results, allergies, chronic diseases, vaccinations, imaging (X-ray) reports, immunization records, etc. and the sensitive
information provided by Alice including her age, weight, family, food statistics, contact information and any other
information related to her health. It is clear that a PHR contains very sensitive data that must be protected. The remote
PHR data centers are responsible for storing users’ PHR data including the data need to be protected. On the one hand, the
remote data centers are usually assumed to be semi-trusted, so the private data should be encrypted. On the other hand,
users usually do not retrieve all the encrypted data but part of them, which demands the searchable encryption scheme
supporting the keyword-based search on the ciphertext.
To ensure Alice’s privacy, one may decide to encrypt her PHR and store only the ciphertexts in the PHR database. Then,
the database can be decrypted on demand. This solution is not practical since Alice needs to be involved in every request to
conduct the decryption.
Incorporating a proxy re-encryption would be a viable solution in this situation. Nevertheless, the traditional proxy re-
encryption is not suitable since the proxy who has the re-encryption key can convert all ciphertext of PHR. Thus, Ibraimi,
Tang, Hartel, and Jonker use Type-based Proxy Re-Encryption (same as C-PRE) to get a more fine-grained PHR disclosure
scheme. But the limitation of C-PRE is the C-PRE will leak the information of keyword (or type) to remote PHR data centers.
It will be great if we choose C-PRES, as the situation will change completely. Suppose different categories of Alice’s
encrypted PHR are accompaniedwith a keyword, such as the encrypted PHR under the keyword ‘‘allergies′′, or the encrypted
PHR under the keyword ‘‘imaging reports′′. Then, Alice categorizes her PHR according to her privacy concerns. For instance,
she can send a trapdoor TAlice,w and a re-encryption key rkAlice,w,Practitioner from Alice to a general practitioner under the
keyword w = ‘‘allergies′′ to the proxy P . By doing this, for the encrypted PHR under the keyword ‘‘allergies’’, it can be
searchable and re-encrypted by proxy P , then it can be decrypted by the specifically authorized general practitioner.
5.3. Application in wireless sensor networks
Recent advancements in wireless communications and electronics have enabled rapid development of wireless sensor
network (WSN). WSN has become the most attractive technology for building automation, which allows users to designate
the building network and subsequently, control building appliances depending on their needs. We assume that the data of
building automation are stored in remote data centers and that the user can access the data through the Internet.
Nevertheless, messages exchanged through the WSN and remote data centers must be protected to improve the safety
of building automation. Further, its importance is to provide various services to authorized users or would-be users, such as
visitors.
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The remote data centers are responsible for storing users’ data including the data need to be protected. On the one hand,
the remote data centers are usually assumed to be semi-trusted, so the private data should be encrypted. On the other hand,
users usually do not retrieve all the encrypted data but only a part of them,which requires the searchable encryption scheme
to support the keyword-based search and keyword-based re-encryption on the ciphertext.
We intend to apply an anonymous conditional proxy re-encryptionwith keyword search, which re-encrypts a ciphertext
of the visitors to delegate the capability of decryption to offer a practical and viable solution for WSN.
At first, visitors cannot control anything in the house due to the security policy. For this reason, the owner needs
to determine the delegation power suitable for visitors to utilize the appliances. After authorization, appliances (lights,
electronic faucets) can now be controlled by visitors. All of the appliances in the building can be managed by the owner and
visitors in C-PRES scheme. For example, the owner may want the visitor to control lights, but not the electronic window
curtains. We use C-PRES to solve this problem as follows. First, let the keywordw = ‘‘lights’’ and send the trapdoor TOwner,w
and re-encryption key rkOwner,w,Visitor to the remote data centers. Then, the ciphertext of lights data which is encrypted by
keyword W = ‘‘lights’’ can be searched and re-encrypted by remote data centers who has rkOwner,W ,Visitor and send to the
visitor, and therefore, they can be decrypted by the visitor. Nevertheless, the visitor cannot re-encrypt the ciphertext of
electronic window curtains data which are encrypted by keywordW = ‘‘curtains’’. Clearly, the provider can learn nothing
about the user’s data such as the specific type and location of the appliance that is being operated.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we present the first Chosen-Ciphertext Secure anonymous conditional proxy re-encryption with keyword
search (C-PRES) scheme, which is an affirmative and effective answer to the open question posed in [33] and [31]. Our
scheme offers several advantages over previous such systems, including: chosen-ciphertext security; keyword-anonymity;
unidirectionality; non-interactivity; and collusion-resistance.
This work motivates a few interesting questions. The first one is how to construct a CCA-secure C-PRES scheme without
random oracles. Actually, our scheme is rely on the ROM since we use Fujisaki–Okamoto transformation to ensure the CCA
secure of first level security, it seems possible to adopt the secure pseudo-random number generators instead of Fujisaki–
Okamoto transformation to avoid the ROM,we leave it as furtherwork. Then, the second question is how to construct C-PRES
schemes without pairings.
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